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By Noam’s approach to philosophical inquiry I have in mind those meta-philosophical conceptual distinctions that appear very often in his technical work and; play a crucial part in presentation and I believe more so in his analysis. For Noam, like many analytic philosophers there is no clear distinction between science and philosophy – because philosophy has no independent domain of inquiry where specific puzzles and problems can be solved by internally developed tools for gaining substantial understanding or insight. What is called ‘philosophy’ now a days is a second order inquiry, i.e. more reflexive parts of (to a large part natural) sciences¹. This is distinct from what Katz’ called traditional view of philosophy, of say, Thomas Nagel, who held that philosophy can tell us something about a-priori truths². Further, Noam’s naturalistic view of philosophy is methodological – that is, that the way for acquiring knowledge about the natural world is through method of scientific inquiry – naturalistic theory creation (not any set of procedures but the social and intellectual practice), this is distinct from Quine’s epistemic naturalism which limits the acquisition of knowledge about the natural world through scientific means in the already existing categories of physical entities – primarily entities of physics.

Broadly, Noam’s categorization of philosophical issues fall under three categories: 1. common-sense 2. theoretical problems and, 3. Pseudo-theoretical problems. Of the three, the third class of issues are mostly incomprehensible and not genuine issues in there existing form. And only fruitful and relevant inquiry can be either common-sense or natural scientific and theoretic in nature. Below, I will first discuss what are common-sense issues followed by natural scientific issues and then briefly talk abut the third category.

1. Common-sense and Oxford Philosophy.

There are a set of issues in that revolve around confusion from how certain words are used. For ex. What “is it like to be” a bat? Can computers “think”? Is “water” H2O? And many more. For Noam, like the oxford linguistic philosophers – to understand what these words and phrases mean is to look at how they are used. Strawson for example noted that “to refer” is something people do, it is an act.³ And to understand how particular linguistic unit is used in action we need to understand how we use them. We use the phrase “is like a”, among other things, to point to some resembling properties; we use “think” when talking about humans and maybe some animals, not organs like brain.

So, there is a category of philosophical questions that are not real questions about natural world but rise from the confused usage of phrases and terms.

The internal-meaning of these words and phrases acquired in natural course of language acquisition and interaction with the outside world have the following properties:

“1. are reasonably assumed to be innate (in the Cartesian sense, as dispositional);

2. are anthropocentric (primarily human interest- and action-related);

3. are rich and (so far) undefined, although (in principle) targets of the naturalistic theory of mind (including growth);

4. are flexibly used in various ways and applied (in metaphor, for example) in a diverse set of circumstances, invite creativity, appear to be domain-general; and

5. are constitutive of an understanding of ‘our’ world, which is the world of everyday practical affairs.”⁴

The problems about phrases and terms can be meaningfully asked when these are constructed within part of explanatory framework – a scientific account and programme. Hence, the way Putnam dealt with the problem of “meaning” is incomprehensible because there is no explanatory framework where this term is used but questions about Davidsonian semantics programme can be asked more fruitfully and are a function of programmes research and explanatory vitality. This leads us to the second class of issues⁵.

2. Theoretical Problems.

To understand this set of problems let us recall that Noam is primarily a natural scientist – a researcher who is studying the properties of a “mental organ” within a biolinguistic framework⁶. This fact in light of his believe about the role of philosophy tells us that Noam’s primary concerns lies in this category of problems, which are the more reflective aspects of biolinguistic naturalistic inquiry. In these issues most of his convictions are drawn from history of scientific practice and ideas. Noam follows Lakatos’ framework and sees the practice of Kuhnian normal science as a competition and comparison of research programmes. For most of his academic life this has been a criticism of empiricist and behaviorist programmes. (But also structuralist and technology based explanatory efforts.) Lakatos notes that “the basic unit of appraisal must be not an isolated theory or conjunction of theories but rather a ‘research programme’, with a conventionally accepted (and thus by provisional decision’ irrefutable’) ‘hard core’ and with a ‘positive heuristic’ which defines problems, outlines the construction of a belt of auxiliary hypotheses, foresees anomalies and turns them victoriously into examples, all according to a preconceived plan.”⁷

Lakatos’ programme comparisons bring Kuhn’s evaluation phase of competing paradigmatic theories into normal science practice. Based on the choice criterion, which the initiated researchers acquires in the course of her training she conducts rational evaluation for justification of a programme. The choice of a research progamme is under-determined by all the facts, which cannot lead a researcher by logic to the correct way of puzzle and problem solving in a domain and no one correct explanatory account. These choices are determined by non-empirical considerations. As the programmes are not empirically equivalent, that is that the relevant evidence for the particular programme’s scope is not shared. What might be within scope of one descriptive and explanatory enterprise might not enter into the other, making their points of contact with nature distinct. The programmes are then judged on other merits: “These five characteristics—accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness—are all standard criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a [programme]. If they had not been, I would have devoted far more space to them in my book, for I agree entirely with the traditional view that they play a vital role when scientists must choose between [programmes]. Together with others of much the same sort, they provide the shared basis for [programme] choice.”⁸

2.1. Methodological Assumptions and Questions

Generally speaking, methodological issues are those that arise out of particular commitments that dictate nature of descriptive and explanatory features of a given programme. These commitments cannot be judged on empirical bases. The above mentioned five values and other like them guide the rational deliberation on these issues. While the eventual degradation of programme might be a logical consequence of its internal features, a researcher in the normal course of work has to justify the work based on such criterion.

In case of biolinguistics, Noam holds that the explanatory goal of the enterprise must be what the human person acquires, how this is structured and how it grows and so enables linguistic performance of a competent person. And for this enterprise to be consistent with related successful programmes it must been treated as part of biology and proceed on similar lines. To not do so as a doctrine, is a form of dualism that treats study of mind-brain distinct from study of rest of human biology⁹ Like biologists, Noam hold that genetics provides for development of specific organs, with specific properties and structures and function within the whole organism. That matures and works according to internal rules, laws of nature and external stimulus. Like natural scientists he believes that idealizations and generalizations with considerations of formalization (in terms of mathematics that captures the nature of system under study¹⁰) are essential, as the goal of a scientist is not to explain the phenomenon, but to develop theories that explains underlying principles of nature¹¹. These and other methodological features shape his explanatory and descriptive enterprise.

These are distinct from behaviorist and empiricist dualist-methodological commitments, in that they postulate powerful general learning mechanism and possibility of boundless learning – for example infinitely varied and all kinds of associations and grammars. Unlike any known features in the biological world. Its explanatory accounts then, restricts itself to set of inputs and observable behaviors – and does not postulate specific internal mechanisms – other then the above mentioned general learning mechanism (like conditioning, associationism etc) contra, the genetically given specific systems. They therefore tend to be externalist and statistical in their explanatory goals and choice of descriptive terms – making the enterprise less adequate on these counts and also on count of external consistency.

This distinction is not clearly demarcated. Methodological commitments do have some empirical bases – the choice of what are the relevant one and their imports to explanatory goals and description restriction are value driven. Biolinguistics is based on the empirical consensus that humans are biological systems and that the genetic and evolutionary developmental programmes have been largely successful.

2.2 Empirical Assumptions and Questions

Empirical assumptions are the concrete descriptive claims about state of things (that such and such is the case, say a mechanism) within any programme.. These claims can in principle be fleshed out for empirical testing within the programmes assumptions and therefore can be empirically substantiated. And the results evaluated on rational grounds – usually not affecting the more established or entrenched ‘hard core’ parts. This could explain why Noam has focused his criticism more on methodological grounds and not on empirical ones, as these can be easily defended as minor anomalies if the methodological assumptions are taken for granted. This is seen by many as a radical idea that paradigms cannot be criticized or defended primarily on empirical grounds but, acceptable to anyone who has studied any period of scientific history.

Empirical assumptions, of say particular mechanism of learning etc, can be judged in principle on the bases of descriptive and explanatory adequacy of a particular instantiation of mechanism under question, and of the feasibility of such mechanism in explaining the relevant phenomenon¹². It goes without saying that all of this is done keeping in mind the relevant evaluations of associated studies within parameters of both (or more) paradigms.

2.2.1. Substantial and Insubstantial Empirical Assumptions:

Compared to methodological commitments, researchers are more flexible in giving up particular empirical assumptions about particular the state of things. This happens when test(s), thought experiments or reflection within the programmes’ parameters repeatedly suggest otherwise, and this might leave the programme largely intact based on other internal factors.

Insubstantial empirical assumptions of a programme are those state of things claims that allow easy reformulation of these claims into substantial empirical assumption and claims of another contending programme, leaving only the differing terminological and descriptive and explanatory choices of the first program intact. When Quine grants possibility of “innate structures of yet unknown characteristics” and “quality space” in acquisition of knowledge this is vague enough in a particular way to be reformulated as a nativist theory of knowledge acquisition¹³. When core empirical assumptions have become insubstantial, it looses much of its power. This combined with external inconsistencies, descriptive inadequacies of postulated mechanism,s and their non-feasibility further weakens a programme.

Substantial empirical assumptions are those that do not allow such reformulation of a particular empirical claim and are thus substantially distinct. Hume’s theory of acquisition of knowledge for example details the mechanism of primary and, secondary impressions forming faded impressions that associate by specific rules; is an empirical assumption. Goodman while studying induction also maintained substantial distinction and this lead him to absurd results¹⁴.

3. Mind-Body Problem as Methodological Assumption of a Failed Programme.

We can now look, albeit only superficially and briefly, at how Noam’s views on the mind-body problem can be seen within this schematic.

What was the mind-body problem? Emphasizing the historicity of Descartes Mind-Body distinction, Desmond Clarke writes that “when Descartes wrote about matter, the matter in question was a theoretical construct of Cartesian natural philosophy. Whatever corpus or materia may have meant in that system, these terms certainly did not mean the same as ‘matter’ today.” And that his mind-body distinction is not “conceptually isomorphic with what is now called the mind-body problem”.¹⁵

Descartes and his contemporary “physical scientists assumed that the universe was composed of microscopic corpuscles and that all natural phenomena could be explained in terms of corpuscular shape, size, motion, and interaction. That nest of commitments proved to be both metaphysical and methodological. As metaphysical, it told scientists what sorts of entities the universe did and did not contain: there was only shaped matter in motion. As methodological, it told them what ultimate laws and fundamental explanations must be like: laws must specify corpuscular motion and interaction, and explanation must reduce any given natural phenomenon to corpuscular action under these laws.”¹⁶

But there are features of the world, Descartes noted, namely of intellect and of willed action – broadly the mental substance or things, that do not allow themselves to be formulated in the corpuscular mechanical framework. This led “Descartes to think of the scope of the material as being co-extensive with those natural phenomena for which we can, at least in principle, provide a scientific explanation, and to classify whatever lies outside the scope of the latter as ‘immaterial’. It may be that mental phenomena are immaterial in both senses.”¹⁷

Then, for Descartes, the Mind-Body problem was a problem of explanatory gap while assuming the adequacy of the given methodological commitment. But after Principia was gradually accepted and corpuscularism gave way to an explanatory account that could include new and ever increasing variety of explanations and entities. After the shift from a rigid to relaxed methodological commitment there was no longer “material” things or substance from which immaterial things could be compared and with the collapse of the “material” there was no gap to be closed. Rather there were all sorts of things in the world – electrical things, chemical things, mental things, etc. The study of how one sort of things interact with other became regular part of scientific effort in mature areas for assimilation and integration.

4 Pseudo-Theoretical Issues & Other Pseudo-Problems.

A large part of writing in philosophy journals does not appear to be formal inquiries in logic or anything like critical programmes appraisal that Chomsky engages in. But if they are not doing this, any historical work or clarification of pseudo-problems, then what are they engaged in? For example, many thinker still write about mind-body problem devoid of any historicity and without any roots in natural sciences. This exercise, since the gradual decline in support of naturalism among some philosophers, tacitly assumes metaphysical inquiries outside the bounds of natural science. But a major lesson from Descartes to Newton chapter in history was that a priori speculation devoid of naturalistic research is not fruitful. What kinds of mechanisms and entities there are in the world is described by best available theories.

Two kinds of a-priori question especially make no sense to Chomsky: those about ontology and realism. And, Chomsky’s approach to ontological issues is almost identical with Carnap’s:

“This voluntarist orientation remained fundamental. The notion that something beyond the scope of science might actually be the case seemed to Carnap a back door to the readmission of traditional prejudices and conformities of all kinds. Certainly we need to make assumptions, he acknowledged, but we can decide on these, and spell them out; they are not “out there” for us to find. On these grounds he deprecated Quine’s preoccupation with ontology. It makes no sense to talk about “what there is,” Carnap said, without specifying the language framework in which this is asserted; any such claim can only be understood or judged relative to a framework. It makes perfectly good sense to ask, within a framework that includes, say, the Zermelo-Frankel axioms for set theory, whether there are infinite numbers. Such “internal” questions have determinate answers. But it makes no sense, outside such a framework, to ask “just in general” whether “there are” infinite numbers. Not only is there no determinate answer, but there is no way to give such an “external” question itself any clear meaning.”¹⁸

Same remarks and in similar terminology can be found in Noam’s interviews and writings. Another kind of question that Noam believes is meaningless is to ask in general is whether such and such thing is real? Things are real within or are crucial part of a ‘language framework’ (borrowing Carnap’s terminology) depending on the choice of ‘language framework’. That is to say, things exists in various senses. For example, Sherlock’s hat is real in the fictional universe, so when we choose to talk about things in Conan Doyle’s book, the hat exists, if we talk about economical things “the economic crisis in Pakistan” is a real thing, in language framework where we are talking about how the natural world works, the things in our best available theories exists. We can only ask whether a thing is real if we are clear about in what sense and ‘language framework’ are we talking about and does that framework has this entity in it.

This view in Chomsky probably has some connections with pragmatism of later Carnap and Frege’s theory of sense. And also the relation between the philosophical attitude associated with this name and the aspects of language use within a community named pragmatism by Mead and Charles Morris. But I cannot proceed in that direction at the moment.

5. Conclusion.

A schematic can only help navigate and guide us in our search but not do the hard work of clear thinking for us. And this schematism I believes gives a clear enough picture to better navigate Noam’s philosophical writings. Noam philosophical project is influenced by Carnap’s scientific philosophy and is a peculiar kind of therapeutic work. These can most visibly be seen in his criticism of behaviorism, which at first was motivated theoretically but as the Cold War took hold of the social sciences and intellectuals were eager in assisting in the task of social management, also for moral and political reasons. The image of human nature behaviorism and empiricism presents and justifies is unacceptable to Noam and to every person who values individual deliberation, choice and liberty. As a substantive thesis, these ideas show tendency to be against the free development of capacities and diminish the role of rational common sense of judgment and creative capacities and justify control – managerial, technocratic, statist, corporate, patriarchal, casteist and other. Humans for Noam and other libertarian socialists are not bound, are undetermined, and seek creative and experimental initiatives taking form of infinite possibilities without coercive in a free associative society. In social writings too similar schema can be found that might shed light on meta-philosophical, moral and practical consideration of Noam Chomsky that I believe are of considerable value in time of multiple and extreme global crisis.

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